

Example 2: Five missed submeasures, each weighted 10 and one missed submeasure weighted 5, all with performance scores of -2

To illustrate:

Missed Submeasure	Wt.	Score	Wt x Score
% completed w/in 5 days(1-5 lines, no dispatch)- UNE-P/other	5	-2	-10
% completed w/in 5 days(1-5 lines, dispatch)- UNE-P/other	10	-2	-20
Average delay days – total - POTS	10	-2	-20
Average delay days – total - Special	10	-2	-20
Average delay days – total - Complex	10	-2	-20
% missed appointments - POTS	10	-2	-20
TOTAL			-110

Here again, no penalty would be due. Since -110 is less than -115.7 in absolute value, no MOE penalty is due. None of these are critical measures so no critical measures penalty is due. Finally, even though all come from the UNE Provisioning domain, there is no domain clustering penalty due under the current proposal.

Of course, many other combinations are available.

III. TRUNKS:

Example: One submeasure weighted 15 and one submeasure weighted 10, both having a performance score of -2

To illustrate:

Missed Submeasure	Wt.	Score	Wt x Score
% on time order confirmation	15	-2	-30
Average delay days – total	10	-2	-20
TOTAL			-50

Since -50 is less than -54 in absolute value (or since $-50/180 = -.278 > -.301 = \min -x$), no MOE penalty is due. Also no critical measures penalty is due since neither of these are critical measures.

IV: COLLOCATIONS : These submeasures are not affected since their min -X is zero. Problems with Collos come from elsewhere, e.g., unreasonably low overall caps.

EXHIBIT B

**Before the
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

Petition of New York Telephone Company)	
for Approval of Its Statement of Generally)	
Available Terms and Conditions Pursuant to)	
Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of)	Case 97-C-0271
1996; and Draft Filing of Petition for)	
InterLATA Entry Pursuant to Section 271 of)	
the Telecommunications Act of 1996)	

Petition filed by Bell Atlantic - New York for)	
Approval of a Performance Assurance Plan)	Case 99-C-0949
and Change Control Assurance Plan, in)	
97-C-0271)	

**COMMENTS OF MCI WORLDCOM, INC.
ON THE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING,
THE AMENDED PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PLAN,
AND THE AMENDED CHANGE CONTROL ASSURANCE PLAN
FOR BELL ATLANTIC - NEW YORK**

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Dated October 4, 1999

provisions a UNE within 3 days or 30 days, it would receive the same score under the PAP. Yet there is obviously a great difference to CLECs and their customers, and to the development of competition in general, between a delay of 3 days and a delay of 30 days. See id. As noted previously, the remedy plans' complex scoring and weighting provisions could excuse several -2 scores even though very clearly the underlying score could not possibly be construed as random error.

VI. The Plans' Scoring Rules Allow Performance at Levels Below Those Determined by the Commission to be Necessary for an Open and Competitive Market

BA-NY has designed the PAP and CCAP to allow it to provide performance to CLECs at levels that are below the standards previously established by this Commission. Other statistical features of the plans provide excessive forgiveness to BA-NY for actual discrimination.

The PAP deviates from the performance standards established by the Commission in Case 97-C-0139 for measures with absolute benchmarks. In order to fit such standards into its performance scoring scheme, BA-NY has redefined the standards. See PAP, app. C, pp. 1-2 (listing lowered standards for benchmarked metrics); PAP, app. F, p. 2 (table providing scoring process for metrics with 95% standards). For metrics benchmarked at 95%, for example, any result greater than 95% receives a score of zero. A result of 95% receives a score of -1, and mandates some (50%) remedy payment in the case of Critical Measures or is deemed as possibly indicating discrimination in the case of MOEs. Decreases of 0.5% in the result translate to decreases of -0.10 in the performance score (with similar increases in remedies in the case of a Critical Measure) until a result of 90%

and a corresponding performance score of –2 is reached. At this point, the full remedy is owed in the Critical Measures case or discrimination is viewed as likely in the MOE case.

Originally, a result less than 95% would indicate discriminatory performance on the part of BA-NY and require a full remedy payment. Under the BA-NY performance scoring plan, such a result does neither. The original outcome is not reached until BA-NY's performance falls to 90%, a full five percentage points below the original *minimum standard*. Indeed, there will be no remedy for violating the original minimum standard in the MOE case unless the inferior performance (between 90% and 95%) continues for at least one out of the next two months. Clearly the BA-NY plan lowers the effective remedy level substantially below the standards set by the Commission.

The reason for this reduction in effective benchmark values is that BA-NY misapplies the initial benchmark, which is a *minimum standard*. BA-NY should have defined a result of 99.5% as scoring a –1 and increment down to a –2 at a result of 95%. A result of less than 95% must be judged to violate the benchmark, indicating discrimination in the form of a –2 performance score and requiring full remedy payment.⁹ No lower score compensates for egregious misses of the benchmark (e.g., –3 score could correspond to misses by more than 15%). BA-NY's plans thus improperly score a miss of a benchmark of 5% as having virtually no competitive significance while scoring any miss of more than 5%, whether 6% or 1000%, as having equal competitive significance.

⁹ Similarly, the PAP provides allowable misses on small sample tests involving benchmarks. See PAP, app. C, p. 3. None of these misses are justified. Benchmarks are minimum standards that were developed taking into account (to the extent possible) random variation and process capability. Therefore if they are not met, no forgiveness is warranted.

Furthermore, the plans contain layer upon layer of forgiveness for random error. This excessive forgiveness reduces the effectiveness of the plans in combating discrimination. In particular, the aggregation procedure wherein submeasures are assigned performance scores based on Z tests and then weighted and aggregated to the MOE level, at which point a minimum aggregate score is used to determine whether a remedy is due, overcompensates for random error. See PAP, app. E. Since the Z test that determined the performance scores already takes random variation into account, trying to account for random variation again in the aggregate amounts to double counting random variation.

To see this, note that under the MOE proposal BA-NY could severely fail ($Z < -1.645$) seven Z tests on important (weighted 15) independent UNE submeasures without being required to pay a remedy. The probability that a lack of parity in UNE provisioning would be indicated when it does not in fact exist, -- based on these seven tests, is about 1 in 1,000,000,000 -- that is, it is negligible. Note also that these submeasures are competitively significant. Thus it would be difficult under these circumstances to justify the claim that discrimination in UNE provisioning does not exist. But that is exactly what the BA-NY plan does. BA-NY's proposal to aggregate these test results under the rubric of performance scores, and to then compute a random variation probability based on this aggregate, clearly overstates the effect of random variation on the statistical decision.

The "-X" scoring system overcompensates BA-NY for random variation, further attenuating the relationship between performance remedies and BA-NY's actual performance. The Minimum -X and Maximum -X scores should be set so that there is a 95% probability of non-parity when Maximum -X is reached and an approximately 80% probability of non-parity at Minimum -X. Instead, BA-NY has defined Minimum -X as

the point at which there is a 95% probability of discrimination, while at Maximum -X there is virtually a zero chance that random variation caused the non-parity results. In particular, Minimum -X is supposed to adjust for the 5% probability of Type I errors when -1.645 is used as the critical value for determining parity. Type I errors occur when BA-NY is judged out of parity but the underlying process is in fact in control; that is, the process providing the service is actually in parity, but the data and consequent statistical testing indicate that it is not, because of statistical variability of the sampling procedure.¹⁰ When the 95% confidence level of a -1.645 Z score is reached, or when a lower Z score is repeated, most regulators have recognized that the probability that disparity is because of random variation is small.¹¹ In fact, particularly for small sample sizes, the chance of Type II error (disparity going undetected and without consequences) is an even greater risk than Type I errors when the critical value of -1.645 is used. Under the PAP, BA-NY only begins to incur penalties for MOEs when the 95% confidence level is reached for the aggregated performance score, in spite of the fact that numerous submeasures could have received a performance of -2 indicating Z scores less than -1.645 that correspond to virtually certain discrimination when taken together. It is therefore the aggregation

¹⁰ The CLEC has still received inferior service based on the data collected, and an incentive therefore should still be paid by BA-NY because of that result – random variation or not.

¹¹ See generally Pennsylvania PUC, Recommended Decision, Docket No. P-00991643, vol. 1, p. 306 (Aug. 6, 1999) (“BA-PA has confused a 5% probability of a Type I error with a 5% guarantee of a Type I error. In other words, simply because there a possibility that every time the Z-score is computed there is a 5% chance of a Type I error does not mean there will be an error 5% of the time. We hasten to add that at best a 5% error is a small risk, particularly in comparison to the 95% certainty produced by the -1.645 Z-score threshold.” (emphasis in original)).

process that leads to the minimum -X penalty interpretation that provides an additional unwarranted monthly adjustment for the 5% probability of a Type I error.

Moreover, the -X scoring system is itself essentially arbitrary. BA-NY determined the "Minimum -X" score by calculating the point at which (1) the unweighted aggregate performance scores (i.e., the total of 0, -1, and -2 scores) for each MOE (2) divided by the number of measures within the MOE (3) cuts off 95% of the probability of error because of random variation. Problems arise because this critical value is to be compared to the weighted performance computed from the data. Specifically, the problem is that an unweighted, aggregate performance score does not correspond uniquely to a weighted Minimum -X score. That is, there is an entire array of weighted performance scores that correspond to a 95% cut off point on the unweighted performance score distribution. Selecting one number from among this array as Minimum -X is completely arbitrary. This arbitrariness can be removed if BA-NY would base Minimum -X on the 80% cutoff of the distribution of weighted performance scores. Unfortunately, this distribution is not easily derived, thus calling into question the entire procedure. MCI WorldCom believes that inherent arbitrariness introduced by the -X scoring process, and the difficulty of eliminating this arbitrariness, mandate the removal of the -X scores from the PAP. The remedy plan would be more targeted against discrimination, even if used as MCI WorldCom suggests as a second tier of remedies for broad market suppression, if the comprehensive scoring is replaced with a scheme that reflects the degree to which parity or each benchmark is missed, whether evaluated against a Z score range or actual percentage differences.

In summary, the plans improperly permit BA-NY to provide below-parity and substandard service without sanction, because of BA-NY's inclusion of lowered performance standards and the use of a faulty –X scoring system. These loopholes allowing discrimination to exist without remedies must be corrected prior to adoption of the plans. Otherwise, the Commission will have established a standard that will be difficult to tighten once BA-NY has entered the long distance market.

VII. Missing Metrics and Incomplete Metrics Definitions Jeopardize the Effectiveness of the Remedy Plans

The plans' critical failings include the fact that they do not incorporate enough metrics to provide a reasonably accurate picture of BA-NY's conduct, and they include definitions of metrics and performance standards that are contrary to this Commission's previous holdings. While BA-NY is no longer opposing efforts to include improved metrics relating to hot cut timeliness and accuracy, UNE flow through, and UNE confirmations and rejection timeliness, the standards BA-NY proposes to use are lower than those adopted or still under discussion in the Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding.

Incorporating all the metrics adopted in the New York Carrier-to-Carrier proceeding would significantly increase the effectiveness of the plans. MCI WorldCom believes that all of the performance metrics developed by the Commission should be included in the performance remedies plan. Otherwise, the omitted metrics will become essentially meaningless, and BA-NY will be encouraged to slow competition by taking actions that only affect these metrics. At a minimum, the list of Critical Measures should be greatly expanded, and BA-NY should not be permitted to delete Critical Measures in

DECLARATION OF KAREN A. KINARD

ATTACHMENT 4

STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

At a session of the Public Service
Commission held in the City of
New York on March 15, 2000

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Maureen O. Helmer, Chairman
Thomas J. Dunleavy
James D. Bennett
Leonard A. Weiss
Neal N. Galvin

- CASE 00-C-0008 - Complaint of MCI Worldcom, Inc. against Bell Atlantic-New York concerning Billing Completion Notices, Firm Order Commitments, Acknowledgements and Tracking Numbers, filed in C 99-C-1529.
- CASE 00-C-0009 - Complaint of AT&T Communications of New York, Inc. against Bell Atlantic-New York concerning Acknowledgements, Completion Notices and Pre-Order Outages, filed in C 99-C-1529.
- CASE 99-C-0949 - Petition filed by Bell Atlantic-New York for Approval of a Performance Assurance Plan and Change Control Assurance Plan, filed in C 97-C-0271.

ORDER DIRECTING MARKET ADJUSTMENTS AND
AMENDING PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PLAN

(Issued and Effective March 23, 2000)

BY THE COMMISSION:

During the past three months, Staff has been investigating problems and monitoring performance with respect to Bell Atlantic-New York's (BA-NY) operations support systems (OSS). Software defects and processing deficiencies have resulted in lost competitive carrier orders and/or missing and delayed status notifiers.

On February 11, 2000, an order was issued directing improvements to BA-NY's wholesale service performance.^{1/} The

^{1/} Cases 00-C-0008 and 00-C-0009, Order Directing Improvements to Wholesale Service Performance (issued February 11, 2000).

order directed BA-NY to take remedial action on an expeditious basis to implement changes that would allow the company to improve its performance. Additionally, BA-NY was directed to clear its backlog of ordering - related trouble tickets issued prior to January 1, 2000 by February 15, 2000. Trouble tickets issued between January 1 and February 11 were to be cleared and appropriate status notifiers given by February 18, 2000. Further, BA-NY was required to file daily reports with the Director of the Office of Communications to track its wholesale provisioning performance.

Staff has closely monitored BA-NY's performance efforts to comply with the requirements of the February 11, 2000 order. While the company's daily performance has been inconsistent, it has implemented software changes to its OSS and several companies have transitioned to the new system. Additionally, BA-NY is making changes to certain of its backend billing systems to limit manual processing, a circumstance that has also resulted in delayed billing notices. BA-NY was unable to meet the requirements set forth in the February 11, 2000 order to clear trouble tickets by the dates required.

After discussions with Department Staff concerning service quality since the February 11, 2000 order, BA-NY committed to provide competitive local exchange companies (CLECs) \$10 million in credits to bills rendered in April beyond the credits which have accrued as a result of BA-NY's not meeting its commitments under the Performance Assurance Plan (PAP).^{1/} Unused credits would be applied to future bills until credits are fully exhausted. BA-NY also agreed in the letter that, based on performance beginning March 13, 2000, it would be subject to bill credits at an additional \$2 million per month, if the company failed to meet new standards that would be included as a Special Provision in the PAP. The new metrics relate to firm order

^{1/} Letter dated March 9, 2000 from Paul A. Crotty, President, New York/Connecticut, to Maureen O. Helmer, Chairman, Public Service Commission.

confirmation notices, the clearing of trouble tickets, and bill completion notices.^{1/} These metrics are designed to ensure that recent problems are resolved and will allow Department Staff to assess whether BA-NY has overcome its OSS difficulties.

Allocation of \$10 Million Bill Credits

The \$10 million in bill credits to be paid by Bell Atlantic-New York (BA-NY) to the competitive carriers will be allocated according to two factors. Because a substantial number of CLEC orders were delayed due to BA-NY's inability to clear trouble tickets, we will allocate seventy percent of the available credit to the CLECs based on the number of each carrier's orders for which BA-NY did not provide a timely response, as defined in clause 1 of the February 11, 2000 Order. Each order will carry equal weight, regardless of how long the trouble ticket had been opened or the ultimate resolution of the trouble ticket, because in each case, BA-NY failed to provide a status report by the required date. The order volumes will be based on information provided to Staff and BA-NY by the CLECs.

The remaining thirty percent of the \$10 million credit will be allocated to the CLECs based on the percentage of lines each affected carrier had in service, as of January 31, 2000. The methodology is designed to provide the remaining credits quickly to CLECs that experienced service during the recent period below the levels of required performance. There is no indication that BA-NY has disproportionately favored any CLEC.

Modifications to the PAP

The PAP includes the metric OR-4-02 in both the Resale and Unbundled Network Element (UNE) modes of entry. OR-4-02 measures the percent of billing completion notices sent by noon the day after an order completes to BA-NY's billing system.

^{1/} The new metrics are as described in "Attachment A" to the Consent Decree in FCC 00-92, In the Matter of New York Telephone Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-New York, Order and Consent Decree (released March 9, 2000).

Additionally, the Carrier Guidelines include metrics to account for the following time intervals: (a) between entry of the physical work completion to BA-NY's service order processor (SOP) and notification to the CLEC of the work completion; and, (b) between entry of the physical work completion to SOP and completion of the order to BA-NY's billing system. Although these latter two aspects of the order processing system are important, BA-NY has not been able to finally report these measures. Consequently, the PAP does not address the entire interval between BA-NY's completion of the physical work and notification to the CLEC of completion to billing.

To address this situation, the PAP will be modified by replacing OR-4-02 with a new metric for billing completion notices, called % SOP to Bill Completion Notice Sent Within 3 Business Days. This new metric is described in Attachment A of the FCC's March 9, 2000 Order. For the PAP, it will apply separately to the Resale and UNE modes of entry, will be measured and reported monthly, and will be subject to a performance standard of 95%.

The PAP will also be modified to add \$2 million in potential monthly credits (\$24 million per year) for three new measurements described in Attachment A of the FCC's March 9, 2000 Order. The \$2 million in potential monthly credits will be allocated to the three new measurements as follows: \$1 million to % Missing Notifier Trouble Ticket PONS Cleared Within 3 Business Days; \$0.5 million to % Order Confirmations/Rejects Sent Within 3 Business Days; and, \$0.5 million to % SOP to Bill Completion Notice Sent Within 3 Business Days.

For the PAP, these special provisions will constitute a Special Provision and will apply to the combined performance for Resale and UNE modes of entry (equal weighting to Resale and UNE orders). They will be measured and reported monthly and each will be subject to a performance standard of 90%. Additionally, % Missing Notifier Trouble Ticket PONS Cleared Within 3 Business Days will be subject to the requirement that no more than 5% of orders resubmitted may be rejected as duplicate orders.

Miscellaneous Matters

On March 10, 2000, BA-NY submitted a detailed plan for expeditiously clearing missing status notifiers. The February 11, 2000 order relating to the clearing of order backlogs remains in effect with respect to this Plan.

BA-NY is also directed to file daily reports on the new metrics with the Director of the Office of Communications bringing data current beginning with March 13, 2000 performance. This information should be provided within five days of the issuance of this order, and thereafter, daily reports should be filed by 3:00 p.m. the following business day. BA-NY is relieved of the necessity to file daily reports required by the February 11, 2000 order, except for the firm order confirmation data which should continue to be filed.

The Commission orders:

1. Bell Atlantic-New York shall provide \$10 million in bill credits with April billings to those CLECs who are eligible in accordance with the methodology set forth in the body of this Order. BA-NY shall provide a proposed distribution list to the Director of the Office of Communications within 5 days of the issuance of this Order.

2. The Performance Assurance Plan shall be amended to add a new Special Provision, which will be made up of the three metrics described in the body of this Order. \$2 million per month will be added to the Performance Assurance Plan and be allocated to this measure.

3. The February 11, 2000 Order shall remain in effect with respect to the clearing of order backlogs in accordance with BA-NY's detailed plan submitted on March 10, 2000.

CASES 00-C-0008. 00-C-0009 and 99-C-0949

4. These proceedings are continued.

By the Commission,

(SIGNED)

DEBRA RENNER
Acting Secretary

DECLARATION OF KAREN A. KINARD

ATTACHMENT 5

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William D. Smith
Senior Regulatory Counsel



September 15, 2000

BY HAND DELIVERY

Honorable Janet Hand Deixler
Secretary
New York State Public Service Commission
Three Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223-1350

Re: Case 99-C-0949 – Performance Assurance Plan – Annual Review

Dear Secretary Deixler:

Pursuant to the Notice dated August 28, 2000 in the above-referenced proceeding, Verizon New York Inc. has outlined below a list of items, *inter alia*, that should be considered during the annual review required under Section II(K)(1) of the Performance Assurance Plan.

Items for Consideration:

- A. Incorporate appropriate changes that Commission has made to the Carrier-to-Carrier ("C2C") Guidelines
 - 1. Modify DSL loop measures to conform to changes incorporated in C2C Guidelines,
 - 2. Add new DSL line-sharing measures for ordering, provisioning and maintenance, and
 - 3. Disaggregate UNE and Resale measures for ordering and provisioning to be consistent with C2C Guidelines.

B. Geographic Reporting

1. Include methodology to compare performance at different geographic levels.

C. Mode of Entry Weights

1. Revise ordering weights by reinstating weights included in January 2000 Performance Assurance Plan, and
2. Re-evaluate weights based on actual market experience.

D. Statistical Issues

1. Add language to enable use of hypergeometric test for percent metrics with small sample sizes,
2. Determine whether actual performance and z scores should be used for performance scoring purposes, and
3. Recalculate minimum threshold standards to reflect additional metrics and change in weights.

E. Revise waiver and exception provisions to mirror Force Majeure provisions in Interconnection Agreements

F. Miscellaneous

1. For Trunk blocking measure, remove 2 month miss and modify 3 month miss to allow for -1 and -2 performance scores, and
2. Review need for Special Provisions Sections.

Respectfully submitted,

William D. Smith

cc:
and Hand Delivery)

Robert T. Mulig, Esq. (By E-mail

Mr. Richard Brash (By E-mail and Hand Delivery)
Active Parties (By E-mail and U.S. Mail)

D

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of)	
)	
Application by Verizon New England Inc.)	
Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc.)	
(d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX)	CC Docket No. 00-176
Long Distance Company (d/b/a Verizon)	
Enterprise Solutions), and Verizon Global)	
Networks Inc., for Authorization to Provide)	
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Massachusetts)	
_____)	

**JOINT DECLARATION
OF PATTY KWAPNIEWSKI AND SHERRY LICHTENBERG
On Behalf of WorldCom, Inc.**

Based on our personal knowledge and on information learned in the course of our duties, we, Patty Kwapniewski and Sherry Lichtenberg, declare as follows:

1. My name is Patty Kwapniewski. I am the Senior Manager, Trading Partner Provisioning Systems - Business Requirements & Testing in WorldCom's Information Technology ("IT") Organization. My responsibilities include managing the business requirements for and the testing of the systems that support trading partner interfaces. Previously, my experience has included physical provisioning, and network engineering process reengineering, accommodating the evolution of the industry in the areas of frame, ATM, the internet and DSL, maintaining the applications and interfaces governed by the Ordering and Billing Forum ("OBF") and consolidating applications and data from systems obtained through

company acquisitions. During the past two years, my responsibilities have broadened to involve user processes and industry requirements that impact the local arena.

2. My name is Sherry Lichtenberg. I am Senior Manager for Operations Support Systems Interfaces and Facilities Testing and Development in the Mass Markets unit of WorldCom, Inc (“WorldCom”). My duties include working with the incumbent local exchange companies (“ILECs”) and WorldCom’s technical and IT organizations to establish commercially viable Operations Support Systems (“OSS”). This includes participating in the design and implementation of local service customer testing and in third party testing. I also help design, manage, and implement WorldCom’s local telecommunications services to residential customers on a mass market basis nationwide. I have nineteen years experience in the telecommunications market, four years with WorldCom and fifteen years with AT&T. Prior to joining WorldCom, I was Pricing and Proposals Director for AT&T Government Markets, Executive Assistant to the President, and Staff Director for AT&T Government Markets.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

3. The purpose of this Joint Declaration is to respond to the contentions of Verizon that it is today providing timely, reliable, nondiscriminatory access to its OSS functions in Massachusetts. In this Joint Declaration, we will explain why the evidence Verizon relies on is insufficient to permit section 271 approval. We will also demonstrate that important deficiencies remain with Verizon’s OSS systems, interfaces, and processes.

4. To begin with, there is not sufficient reason to believe that Verizon's OSS is ready to process commercial volumes of orders efficiently and accurately. Verizon cannot rely on its New York experience to show the readiness of its Massachusetts OSS because of key differences in the OSS between the two states, which we will describe below, and because of ongoing problems even in New York. Verizon cannot rely on its Massachusetts experience to show the readiness of its OSS because it essentially has no such experience – at least with respect to UNE Platform ("UNE-P"), the only service delivery method capable of supporting a ubiquitous residential launch. In Massachusetts, in its highest volume month, Verizon processed 5,000 UNE-P orders – and only 4 of those orders were via Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI") – the interface CLECs would rely on if they were providing service at commercial volumes. In contrast, in New York, WorldCom alone is placing 3,000 to 5,000 orders per day and is placing those orders via EDI. The lack of commercial usage in Massachusetts does not result from any fault of the CLECs but rather results from the price squeeze, discussed in a separate WorldCom declaration, which renders commercial entry a losing proposition economically.

5. Without significant commercial usage, Verizon must rely almost exclusively on the KPMG test to prove readiness of its OSS. But no third party test is an adequate substitute for commercial usage. Certainly, the KPMG test in Massachusetts is not such a substitute. That test is not like the rigorous KPMG test in New York (or like the test in Pennsylvania) even setting aside the important fact that the New York test merely supplemented relatively robust commercial usage.